TTIP’s Monetary Clause Muddle

We argue that TTIP negotiations, which are focused on improving conditions for mutual trade and investments between the U.S. and the EU, have overlooked the issue of the influence of monetary and exchange rate policies of both sides on the potential results of a prospective agreement. Thus we demons...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Polish quarterly of international affairs 2015-07, Vol.24 (3), p.107-118
Main Authors: Dunin-Wąsowicz, Maria, Żukrowska, Katarzyna
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agreements
American dollar
Cooperation
Currency
Economic policy
Economists
Economy
Foreign exchange rates
Integration
Monetary policy
Politics
Politics / Political Sciences
Studies
Subsidies
Supranational / Global Economy
Tariffs
Trade agreements
Treaties
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Summary:We argue that TTIP negotiations, which are focused on improving conditions for mutual trade and investments between the U.S. and the EU, have overlooked the issue of the influence of monetary and exchange rate policies of both sides on the potential results of a prospective agreement. Thus we demonstrate that the agreement should have been supplemented by a monetary clause (MC) in order to avoid a possible mismatch between U.S. and EU currencies. Such a clause, and no other possible currency related legal instruments, should be broad, and aim to regulate the bond between the dollar and the euro. It can work as a convenient springboard to invigorate the multilateral trade system via the institutional nexus of the IMF, WTO, OECD or G-20. The clause can make the agreement as important for strategic relations between the U.S. and the EU as the Treaty of Rome was for the rise of European integration.
ISSN:1230-4999
2545-1901