Coalitional Bayesian Nash Implementation in Differential Information Economies

A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implem...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2001-09, Vol.18 (2), p.485-509
Main Authors: Hahn, Guangsug, Yannelis, Nicholas C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied economics
Economic agents
Economic theory
Endowments
Information economics
Information economy
Integers
Nash equilibrium
Social choice
Trade
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Summary:A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/PL00004196