Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints

We consider a dynamic screening model with serially independent types where the agent is short-term liquidity constrained. We model a liquidity constraint as a hard constraint that forces the agent to renege whenever he would suffer a loss from fulfilling the contract terms in a given period. In par...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2024-11
Main Authors: Krähmer, Daniel, Strausz, Roland
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:We consider a dynamic screening model with serially independent types where the agent is short-term liquidity constrained. We model a liquidity constraint as a hard constraint that forces the agent to renege whenever he would suffer a loss from fulfilling the contract terms in a given period. In particular, the violation of a liquidity constraint is a verifiable event that future contract terms can condition on. This verifiability leads to less stringent truth-telling constraints than those considered in the existing literature. We show that the weaker constraints do not affect optimal contracting, however. Moreover, we develop a novel method to study private values settings with continuous types and show that a regularity condition that has analogues in the literature on multi-dimensional screening ensures that the optimal contract is deterministic.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-024-01616-2