How to solve the problem of phenomenal unity: finding alternatives to the single state conception

The problem of phenomenal unity (PPU) consists in providing a phenomenological characterization of the difference between phenomenally unified and disunified conscious experiences. Potential solutions to PPU are faced with an important challenge (which Tim Bayne calls the “explanatory regress object...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 2017-12, Vol.16 (5), p.811-836
Main Author: Wiese, Wanja
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognitive Psychology
Education
Phenomenology
Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
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Summary:The problem of phenomenal unity (PPU) consists in providing a phenomenological characterization of the difference between phenomenally unified and disunified conscious experiences. Potential solutions to PPU are faced with an important challenge (which Tim Bayne calls the “explanatory regress objection”). I show that this challenge can be conceived as a phenomenological dual to what is known as Bradley’s regress . This perspective (i) facilitates progress on PPU by finding duals to possible solutions to Bradley’s regress and (ii) makes it intelligible why many characterize phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a single global conscious state. I call this latter view the “single state conception” (SSC). SSC is superficially attractive, because it seems to provide a solution to the phenomenological dual to Bradley’s regress, but should still be rejected, because (1) it does not solve PPU; (2) instead, it creates more problems; (3) these problems can be avoided by alternative conceptions of phenomenal unity.
ISSN:1568-7759
1572-8676
DOI:10.1007/s11097-016-9478-7