Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg

Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we explore the question ofwhether direct election of the mayor affects the size of local governments. Using difference-in-differences estimation and propensity score matching, we find evidence that direct elections of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2016-09, Vol.168 (3/4), p.177-216
Main Author: Köppl-Turyna, Monika
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economics
Economics and Finance
Political Science
Public Finance
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Summary:Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we explore the question ofwhether direct election of the mayor affects the size of local governments. Using difference-in-differences estimation and propensity score matching, we find evidence that direct elections of the mayor are associated with less expenditure on public administration and public personnel and higher expenditure in the visible categories of spending, i.e., transportation infrastructure and economic subsidies to firms and individuals.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-016-0355-2