Recklessness, Agent-Relative Prerogatives, and Latent Obligations: Does Belief-Relativity Trump Fact-Relativity with Respect to Our Rights?

Are our rights—to our bodily integrity, to our possessions, to the goods and services promised us, and so on—matters of fact, or are our rights functions of others’ beliefs about how their acts will affect our rights? The conventional view states that subjective oughts—based on what we believe—deter...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophia (Ramat Gan) 2023-11, Vol.51 (5), p.2639-2655
Main Author: Alexander, Larry
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Science
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Summary:Are our rights—to our bodily integrity, to our possessions, to the goods and services promised us, and so on—matters of fact, or are our rights functions of others’ beliefs about how their acts will affect our rights? The conventional view states that subjective oughts—based on what we believe—determine culpability, whereas objective oughts—based on the facts—determine permissibility. After all, the idea that our beliefs about how our acts would affect others’ rights might affect the contours of those rights themselves appears deeply paradoxical. For how can others’ rights be based on our beliefs when those beliefs have as their objects not themselves but others’ rights? Nonetheless, paradoxical as that position may appear, a strong case can be mounted in its defense, not by focusing on the rights themselves, but by focusing on the acts that imperil those rights. It is the burden of this essay to make a case for the belief-relativity rather than the fact-relativity of rights.
ISSN:0048-3893
1574-9274
DOI:10.1007/s11406-023-00701-5