Robustness in binary-action supermodular games revisited

We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Japanese economic review (Oxford, England) England), 2024-07
Main Authors: Oyama, Daisuke, Takahashi, Satoru
Format: Article
Language:English
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Description
Summary:We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles.
ISSN:1352-4739
1468-5876
DOI:10.1007/s42973-024-00162-9