A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems

This paper provides a structure unifying several recent results on an incentive optimal resource allocation problem. They include an incentive-compatible modification of the Heal Algorithm, a generalization of it allowing the formation of secret coalitions and a class of center-free resource allocat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Systems & control letters 1987-05, Vol.8 (5), p.475-481
Main Authors: Chiu, Samuel S, Lin, Qing
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Incentive compatibility
Linear dynamic systems
Non-subsidizing
Resource allocation
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Summary:This paper provides a structure unifying several recent results on an incentive optimal resource allocation problem. They include an incentive-compatible modification of the Heal Algorithm, a generalization of it allowing the formation of secret coalitions and a class of center-free resource allocation algorithms as special cases. Our framework encompasses these earlier results and allows us to characterize a large class of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation algorithms.
ISSN:0167-6911
1872-7956
DOI:10.1016/0167-6911(87)90090-9