Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity

• Published in: Applied mathematics and computation 2023-02, Vol.439, p.127635, Article 127635
• Main Authors: Liao, Hui-Min, Hao, Qing-Yi, Qian, Jia-Li, Wu, Chao-Yun, Guo, Ning, Ling, Xiang
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Local and global popularity
• ISSN: 0096-3003; 1873-5649
• DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2022.127635

•A prisoner’s dilemma game considering local and global popularity is presented.•The weight and scaling index of the popularity are introduced to the fitness.•Local and global popularity have different effects on cooperative behavior.•There exists optimal value of positive scaling index for cooperative behavior. Motivated by the realistic situation that local and global information feedbacks maybe influence on the cooperative behavior, a new model of spatial prisoner’s dilemma game is proposed to consider the local popularity and global popularity based on the number of players who hold the same strategy with the central or target agent in the local and global environments. The weight of local popularity and the scaling index of the popularity are introduced to the fitness calculation. Numerical experiments show that the information of local popularity and global popularity have different effects on cooperative behavior when the scaling index of the popularity changes from positive to negative. And when the scaling index of the popularity is negative, the greater the absolute value of the scaling index is, the more conducive it is to the cooperation; but there exists the optimal value of the scaling index for the cooperative behavior when the scaling index is positive. These results maybe offer sights to a comprehensive understanding of the influence of the popularity on promoting cooperation.