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Impact of binary social status with hierarchical punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
•An asymmetric evolutionary game with binary social status and hierarchical punishment is numerically considered.•The binary social status with hierarchical punishment can promote the cooperation in square lattice.•The cooperators survive by forming the clusters and attaching to the punishers.•There...
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Published in: | Chaos, solitons and fractals solitons and fractals, 2020-01, Vol.130, p.109422, Article 109422 |
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Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | •An asymmetric evolutionary game with binary social status and hierarchical punishment is numerically considered.•The binary social status with hierarchical punishment can promote the cooperation in square lattice.•The cooperators survive by forming the clusters and attaching to the punishers.•There is an optimal value of the initial fraction of the powerful group for the excitation of the cooperation.•For the powerful group centralized environment, the agents with special punitive right are more willing to enforce it.
Since ancient times, people have lived in a hierarchical society. In this paper, we consider a simple hierarchical society with disadvantaged group and powerful group(i.e. the binary social status). The ability for powerful group is reflected to be a punisher, and this privilege cannot be imitated by the disadvantaged agent. On this base, the theory of asymmetric evolutionary game with hierarchical punishment is extend. And its impact on the evolution of cooperation is studied. The simulation results show that the hierarchical punishment with square lattices connection can promote the cooperation. Specifically, there is a reverse phenomenon of the cooperation for different social fines with the increasing temptation. Interestingly, the living cooperators survive not only by forming clusters, but also by attaching to the punishers. There is an optimal initial fraction of the powerful group for the excitation of cooperation. The cooperation on the island of powerful agents reveal that the influence range of the punitive right is limited, but the powerful agent squint towards this special right. Taken together, we deeply study the mechanism of the hierarchical punishment to the cooperation. The new recognitions may provide some novel perspectives for engineering better social systems. |
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ISSN: | 0960-0779 1873-2887 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109422 |