Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces

This note shows how to solve a mechanism design problem and how to obtain revenue equivalence in a multi-agent quasilinear environment, where each agent's type space is a measurable subset of the real line, not necessarily convex nor finite.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2006-05, Vol.91 (2), p.293-299
Main Author: Skreta, Vasiliki
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Mechanism design
Non-convex type spaces
Revenue equivalence
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Description
Summary:This note shows how to solve a mechanism design problem and how to obtain revenue equivalence in a multi-agent quasilinear environment, where each agent's type space is a measurable subset of the real line, not necessarily convex nor finite.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.005