Evolutionary stability for games played on networks

In this paper, we propose a notion of evolutionary stability for games played on networks. We then apply it to a coordination game played on networks. •We define Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) for games played on networks.•We apply this to coordination games for arbitrary networks.•We provide...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2023-08, Vol.229, p.111222, Article 111222
Main Authors: Chatterjee, Arko, Rao, K.S. Mallikarjuna, Sarangi, Sudipta
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Evolutionary stability
Nash equilibrium
Networks
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Summary:In this paper, we propose a notion of evolutionary stability for games played on networks. We then apply it to a coordination game played on networks. •We define Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) for games played on networks.•We apply this to coordination games for arbitrary networks.•We provide examples of ESS for specific networks like regular and tree networks.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111222