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Truthful auction mechanisms for resource allocation in the Internet of Vehicles with public blockchain networks

Recording vehicle driving data into the blockchain can effectively solve problems of data authenticity and security, which is a focus of research on blockchain and the Internet of Vehicles. However, when using blockchain technology, the proof-of-work completed by vehicles may consume substantial ene...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Future generation computer systems 2022-07, Vol.132, p.11-24
Main Authors: Zhang, Jixian, Lou, Wenlu, Sun, Hao, Su, Qian, Li, Weidong
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Recording vehicle driving data into the blockchain can effectively solve problems of data authenticity and security, which is a focus of research on blockchain and the Internet of Vehicles. However, when using blockchain technology, the proof-of-work completed by vehicles may consume substantial energy and computing resources, which limits the application of blockchain technology in the internet of vehicles environment. Therefore, this paper considers deploying edge computing nodes to support blockchain technology and introducing an auction mechanism to encourage users to record vehicle driving data as miners. This paper proposes two auction mechanisms for the blockchain network formed by edge computing service providers and miners to maximize the social welfare. Specifically, one mechanism is used when the resource demands of the miners are the same, and the other is used when the resource demands of the miners are different. For resource allocation, the former uses the maximum cost maximum flow algorithm to achieve optimal allocation, and the latter uses a heuristic algorithm. For price payment, the former uses the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism, and the latter uses dichotomy. These two price payment algorithms use critical value theory to calculate the payment price. This paper demonstrates that both are truthful and individually rational. Through experiments, this paper evaluates indicators such as social welfare, satisfaction, and resource utilization. The experiments show that the proposed auction mechanism can effectively maximize social welfare in the blockchain network and provide an effective resource allocation strategy for edge computing service providers. •Using blockchain technology, the real-time data of vehicle travel in the IoV are recorded, and a mathematical programming model is established between the edge computing servers and miners.•To encourage users to participate in block recording as miners to maximize social welfare, two auction mechanisms, namely, a constant-demand auction mechanism (CDAM) and a multi-demand auction mechanism (MDAM), are designed. We demonstrate the economic characteristics of them.
ISSN:0167-739X
1872-7115
DOI:10.1016/j.future.2022.02.002