Sincere voting in large elections

Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere/informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter—one that receives no information in favor of either of the alter...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2017-01, Vol.101, p.121-131
Main Authors: Acharya, Avidit, Meirowitz, Adam
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Informative voting
Sincere voting
Strategic voting
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Summary:Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere/informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter—one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives—as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a “no evidence type.” The expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small; nevertheless, if the electorate is large enough, then each of the two standard Condorcet types votes sincerely in every nondegenerate type-symmetric equilibrium.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010