A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

Given a standard myopic process in a coalition formation game, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of coalition structures that is never left once entered through this process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be la...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2024-11, Vol.148, p.1-22
Main Authors: Bonifacio, A.G., Inarra, E., Neme, P.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Absorbing set
Coalition formation
Convergence to stability
Reduced form of a game
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Summary:Given a standard myopic process in a coalition formation game, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of coalition structures that is never left once entered through this process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a “reduced form” of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.
ISSN:0899-8256
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.014