Quantitative risk assessment of the interior of a hydrogen refueling station considering safety barrier systems

• Published in: International journal of hydrogen energy 2019-08, Vol.44 (41), p.23522-23531
• Main Authors: Tsunemi, Kiyotaka, Kihara, Takehiro, Kato, Etsuko, Kawamoto, Akemi, Saburi, Tei
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Event tree analysis; Explosion; Heat radiation; Hydrogen refueling station; Quantitative risk assessment
• ISSN: 0360-3199; 1879-3487
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ijhydene.2019.07.027

A quantitative risk assessment of human life during the operation of a hydrogen refueling station (HRS) is conducted. We calculate the risks for three accident scenarios: a hydrogen leak from the external piping surrounding a dispenser, a hydrogen leak from an accumulator connection piping and a hydrogen leak from a compressor/connection piping in the HRS. We first calculate the probability of accident by multiplying the estimated leak frequency with the incident occurrence probability considering the ignition probability and failure probability of the safety barrier systems obtained through event tree analysis for each scenario. We next simulate the blast and flame effects of the ignition of concentration fields formed by hydrogen leakage. We then use existing probit functions to estimate the consequences of eardrum rupture, fatalities due to displacement by the blast wave, fatalities due to head injuries, first-degree burns, second-degree burns, and fatal burn injuries by accident scenario, leak size, and incident event, and we estimate the risk distribution in 1-m cells. We finally assess the risk reduction effects of barrier placement and the distance to the dispenser and quantify the risk level that HRSs can achieve under existing law. Quantitative risk assessment reveals that the risk for a leak near the dispenser is less than 10−6 per year outside a distance of 6 m to the dispenser. The risk for a leak near the accumulators and compressors exceeds 10−4 per year within a distance of 10 m from the ignition point. A separation of 6 m to the dispenser and a barrier height of 3 m keep the fatal risk from burns to the workers, consumers and residents and passersby below the acceptable level of risk. Our results therefore show that current laws sufficiently mitigate the risks posed by HRSs and open up the possibility for a regulatory review. •A quantitative risk assessment of human life in a hydrogen refueling station (HRS) was conducted.•A separation distance of 6 m to the dispenser keeps the fatal risk from burns to the residents and passersby.•A barrier height of 3 m keeps the fatal risk from burns to the workers and consumers in the HRS.•Current laws sufficiently mitigate the risks posed by HRSs.