Loading…
Preference disaggregation analysis for sorting problems in the context of group decision-making with uncertain and inconsistent preferences
•This paper aims to solve multiple criteria sorting problems involving multiple DMs.•A preference disaggregation approach with uncertain and contradictory preferences.•Assignment examples and pairwise comparisons for reference alternatives are considered.•A case study of financial investment decisio...
Saved in:
Published in: | Information fusion 2024-01, Vol.101, p.102014, Article 102014 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | •This paper aims to solve multiple criteria sorting problems involving multiple DMs.•A preference disaggregation approach with uncertain and contradictory preferences.•Assignment examples and pairwise comparisons for reference alternatives are considered.•A case study of financial investment decisions for government-funded projects.
Preference disaggregation analysis is effective for inferring a preference model of decision makers from decision examples. Although multiple criteria sorting problems are often handled within the context of group decision-making, it has not been well studied how to estimate a collective sorting model for a group with uncertain and inconsistent preferences through preference disaggregation. To this end, this paper proposes a threshold-based value-driven preference disaggregation method to solve multiple criteria sorting problems involving multiple decision-makers. We allow decision-makers to reduce the cognitive effort of preference expressions by providing possible classes of reference alternatives or pairwise comparisons between them through uncertain expressions. In addition, we develop a two-stage inconsistency identification and elimination procedure that includes dealing with contradictory preference information provided by a single decision maker and managing disagreement among a group of decision makers. A collective preference model consisting of an additive value function and value thresholds is estimated by linear programming. The proposed method is demonstrated by a practical example of financial investment decisions for government-funded projects. The results show that dealing with uncertain and inconsistent preferences can improve the accuracy of preference disaggregation. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1566-2535 1872-6305 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.inffus.2023.102014 |