Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The case of administrative review

•We present an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the area of administrative review.•The estimation of judicial ideology controls for dissent suppression effort.•We identify political clusters which seem inconsistent with the formal views that a career judic...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International review of law and economics 2017-10, Vol.52, p.16-28
Main Authors: Pellegrina, Lucia Dalla, Garoupa, Nuno, Gómez-Pomar, Fernando
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Career judiciary
Dissent avoidance
Empirical legal studies
Ideal point
Ideology
Judicial behavior
Spanish supreme court
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Summary:•We present an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the area of administrative review.•The estimation of judicial ideology controls for dissent suppression effort.•We identify political clusters which seem inconsistent with the formal views that a career judiciary is politically neutral.•We find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus. This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000–2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.
ISSN:0144-8188
1873-6394
DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003