Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of contemporary accounting & economics 2023-04, Vol.19 (1), p.100341, Article 100341
Main Authors: Yik-Pui Low, Steven, Foo, Yee-Boon, Gul, Ferdinand A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Audit committee
Audit fee
Audit risk
Corporate lobbying
Earnings management
Female director
Independent board
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Summary:Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.
ISSN:1815-5669
DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2022.100341