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Evolutionary game analysis on the implementation of subsidy policy for sustainable transportation development

The priority development of public transport cannot be achieved without the support of the government’s fiscal and taxation policies, while the implementation of the subsidy policy is the joint effect of multiple stakeholders. This paper analyzes the implementation mechanism of public transport subs...

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Published in:Journal of cleaner production 2020-09, Vol.267, p.122159, Article 122159
Main Authors: Zhang, Linling, Long, Ruyin, Huang, Zheng, Li, Wenbo, Wei, Jia
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Language:English
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creator Zhang, Linling
Long, Ruyin
Huang, Zheng
Li, Wenbo
Wei, Jia
description The priority development of public transport cannot be achieved without the support of the government’s fiscal and taxation policies, while the implementation of the subsidy policy is the joint effect of multiple stakeholders. This paper analyzes the implementation mechanism of public transport subsidy policy from the perspective of carbon emission to discuss the evolutionary stability strategy of tripartite game under different situations, thereby clarifying the key factors affecting the evolutionary path of the stability strategy through simulation. The main conclusions achieved are as follows: (1) When the subsidy and sunk cost are greater than the improper profit brought by the false report, and the travel cost (time and economy) of public transport is greater than that of the individual motorized travel combined, the three will eventually arrive at the state in which government chooses no-audit, the enterprise chooses true report, and the resident choose public transport; (2) More government supervision can help reduce the false reporting behavior of public transport enterprises in the implementation of public transport subsidy policy; (3) The punishment and the improper profit brought by the false report are also the key factors that influence the behavior decision-making of the government and the enterprises; (4) The economic cost of travel plays an important role in the evolution path of residents’ stabilization strategy, yet is of little significance on the behavior decision of enterprises and governments. From the perspective of sustainable transportation development, it is necessary for the government to control or even reduce the ticket price of public transport, and to increase the economic cost of individual motorized travel.
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This paper analyzes the implementation mechanism of public transport subsidy policy from the perspective of carbon emission to discuss the evolutionary stability strategy of tripartite game under different situations, thereby clarifying the key factors affecting the evolutionary path of the stability strategy through simulation. The main conclusions achieved are as follows: (1) When the subsidy and sunk cost are greater than the improper profit brought by the false report, and the travel cost (time and economy) of public transport is greater than that of the individual motorized travel combined, the three will eventually arrive at the state in which government chooses no-audit, the enterprise chooses true report, and the resident choose public transport; (2) More government supervision can help reduce the false reporting behavior of public transport enterprises in the implementation of public transport subsidy policy; (3) The punishment and the improper profit brought by the false report are also the key factors that influence the behavior decision-making of the government and the enterprises; (4) The economic cost of travel plays an important role in the evolution path of residents’ stabilization strategy, yet is of little significance on the behavior decision of enterprises and governments. 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subjects Carbon emission
Dynamic evolution path
Public transport
Subsidy policy
Tripartite game
title Evolutionary game analysis on the implementation of subsidy policy for sustainable transportation development
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