Common ownership of public goods

We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 2020-12, Vol.180, p.555-578
Main Authors: Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija, Pafilis, Evagelos
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Common ownership
Common pool resources
Joint ownership
Property rights theory
Public goods
Relational contracts
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Summary:We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002