Conformism, social pressure, and the dynamics of integration

We consider a model in which each individual belonging to an ethnic minority group is embedded in a network of relationships and decides whether she wants to be integrated in the society. Each individual wants her behavior to agree with her personal ideal preference for integration but also wants he...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 2024-04, Vol.220, p.279-304
Main Authors: Olcina, Gonzalo, Panebianco, Fabrizio, Zenou, Yves
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Integration
Networks
Peer pressure
Policies
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Summary:We consider a model in which each individual belonging to an ethnic minority group is embedded in a network of relationships and decides whether she wants to be integrated in the society. Each individual wants her behavior to agree with her personal ideal preference for integration but also wants her behavior to be as close as possible to the average integration behavior of her peers. We show that there is always convergence to a steady-state and characterize it. We also show that different preferences for integration may emerge in steady state depending on the structure of the network. Then, we consider an optimal tax/subsidy policy which aim is to reach a certain level of integration in the population.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.02.021