Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India

In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predict...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 2024-11, Vol.227, p.106640, Article 106640
Main Authors: Afridi, Farzana, Bhattacharya, Sourav, Dhillon, Amrita, Solan, Eilon
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Audit
Corruption
Electoral competition
Uncertainty
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Summary:In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition. •Electoral competition is usually associated with lower corruption.•Our model shows that this holds only if electoral uncertainty is low.•Corruption increases when electoral competition increases beyond a threshold.•Data from a public employment guarantee program in India confirms these predictions.
ISSN:0167-2681
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.018