Task allocation and on-the-job training

We study dynamic task allocation when providers' expertise evolves endogenously through training. We characterize optimal assignment protocols and compare them to discretionary procedures, where it is the clients who select their service providers. Our results indicate that welfare gains from c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic theory 2023-01, Vol.207, p.105587, Article 105587
Main Authors: Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Lee, SangMok, Yariv, Leeat
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Dynamic matching
Market design
Training-by-doing
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Summary:We study dynamic task allocation when providers' expertise evolves endogenously through training. We characterize optimal assignment protocols and compare them to discretionary procedures, where it is the clients who select their service providers. Our results indicate that welfare gains from centralization are greater when tasks arrive more rapidly, and when training technologies improve. Monitoring seniors' backlog of clients always increases welfare but may decrease training. Methodologically, we explore a matching setting with endogenous types, and illustrate useful adaptations of queueing theory techniques for such environments.
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2022.105587