Self-organized cooperative behavior and critical penalty in an evolving population

The emergence of cooperation and the effectiveness of penalties among competing agents are studied via a model of evolutionary game incorporating adaptive behavior and penalties for illegal acts. For initially identical agents, a phase diagram is obtained via an analytic approach, with results in go...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Physica A 2009-10, Vol.388 (20), p.4445-4452
Main Authors: Xu, Chen, Hui, P.M., Yu, You-Yang, Gu, Guo-Qing
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Penalty
Self-organized cooperation
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Summary:The emergence of cooperation and the effectiveness of penalties among competing agents are studied via a model of evolutionary game incorporating adaptive behavior and penalties for illegal acts. For initially identical agents, a phase diagram is obtained via an analytic approach, with results in good agreement with numerical simulations. The results show that there exists a critical penalty for achieving a completely honest population and a sufficiently well-behaved initial population requires no penalty. Self-organized segregation to extreme actions emerges in the dynamics for a system with uniformly distributed initial tendencies for cooperation. After training, the penalty can be relaxed without ruining the adapted cooperative behavior. Results of our model in a population taking on the form of a 2D square lattice are also reported.
ISSN:0378-4371
1873-2119
DOI:10.1016/j.physa.2009.07.013