Decentralized Manufacturing Supply Chains Coordination under Uncertain Competitiveness

The coordination of decentralized multi-product manufacturing SCs is achieved through negotiations based on expected win-win principles in an uncertain competitive environment. Based on non-symmetrical roles of the different actors, the client (as leader) is supposed to propose coordination contract...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Procedia engineering 2015, Vol.132, p.942-949
Main Authors: Hjaila, K., Laínez-Aguirre, J.M., Puigjaner, L., Espuña, A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Coordination
Decentralized Supply Chains
Manufacturing Planning
Negotiation
Uncertainty
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Summary:The coordination of decentralized multi-product manufacturing SCs is achieved through negotiations based on expected win-win principles in an uncertain competitive environment. Based on non-symmetrical roles of the different actors, the client (as leader) is supposed to propose coordination contracts according to its best expected conditions, taking into account the uncertain reaction of the provider (follower). This uncertain reaction is modeled as a probability of acceptance, computed according to the overall scenario conditions, which include the presence of 3rd parties. Different negotiation scenarios are analyzed considering cooperative and non-cooperative cases. The resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated using a case study with different providers (follower SC) around a client (leader SC) interacting in a global decentralized scenario. The negotiations based on non-cooperative cases proves to identify the situation with higher independent profit expectations. Moreover, the proposed approach shows the importance of considering the uncertainty associated with the response of the follower to the leader's decisions, resulting from a wider knowledge of its options.
ISSN:1877-7058
1877-7058
DOI:10.1016/j.proeng.2015.12.581