Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization

Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an ax...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Research in economics 2017-03, Vol.71 (1), p.43-50
Main Authors: Peleg, Bezalel, Peters, Hans
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anonymity
Axiomatization
Feasible elimination procedure
Independent blocking
Maskin monotonicity
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Summary:Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondences resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking. We also show that these axioms are logically independent.
ISSN:1090-9443
1090-9451
DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2016.11.006