Pareto optimum by independent trials

We consider a method by which players in a continuous N-person game can arrive at a Pareto optimal solution by a trial process. The process has a number of novel features. Firstly, it is assumed that the players do not know the payoff functions. Secondly, the players are assumed to act quite indepen...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Bulletin of the Australian Mathematical Society 1975-04, Vol.12 (2), p.259-265
Main Authors: Gates, D.J., Rickard, J.A.
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:We consider a method by which players in a continuous N-person game can arrive at a Pareto optimal solution by a trial process. The process has a number of novel features. Firstly, it is assumed that the players do not know the payoff functions. Secondly, the players are assumed to act quite independently. In spite of this lack of information and lack of cooperation, the players eventually arrive at what is usually regarded as a cooperative solution. The process is a model of the accounting procedures used by firms, and the results predict approach to an equilibrium state of a market model. Proofs are given only in outline here.
ISSN:0004-9727
1755-1633
DOI:10.1017/S0004972700023856