Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups

It is an established fact that off-cycle elections attract lower voter turnout than on-cycle elections. I argue that the decrease in turnout that accompanies off-cycle election timing creates a strategic opportunity for organized interest groups. Members of interest groups with a large stake in an e...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of politics 2011-04, Vol.73 (2), p.412-427
Main Author: Anzia, Sarah F.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Boards of education
Districts
Elections
Electoral districts
Interest Groups
Local elections
Political interest groups
Political Systems
Presidential elections
School Districts
State elections
Teacher salaries
Teachers
Unions
Voter behavior
Voter Turnout
Voting Behavior
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Summary:It is an established fact that off-cycle elections attract lower voter turnout than on-cycle elections. I argue that the decrease in turnout that accompanies off-cycle election timing creates a strategic opportunity for organized interest groups. Members of interest groups with a large stake in an election outcome turn out at high rates regardless of election timing, and their efforts to mobilize and persuade voters have a greater impact when turnout is low. Consequently, policy made by officials elected in off-cycle elections should be more favorable to the dominant interest group in a polity than policy made by officials elected in on-cycle elections. I test this theory using data on school district elections in the United States, in which teacher unions are the dominant interest group. I find that districts with off-cycle elections pay experienced teachers over 3% more than districts that hold on-cycle elections.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1017/S0022381611000028