Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe

I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert 'Q and I don't believe that Q' sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (G...

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Published in:Australasian journal of philosophy 2012-09, Vol.90 (3), p.541-546
Main Author: Pruss, Alexander R.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
assertion
belief
Belief & doubt
language
lying
Philosophers
Philosophy
sincerity
Truth
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description I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert 'Q and I don't believe that Q' sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis).
doi_str_mv 10.1080/00048402.2011.611150
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source Taylor and Francis Social Sciences and Humanities Collection
subjects assertion
belief
Belief & doubt
language
lying
Philosophers
Philosophy
sincerity
Truth
title Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe
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