Corruption, Centralization and Competition: Evidence from Russian Public Procurement

This paper estimates the impact of corruption on the incentives of procurers to maintain honest competition in tenders. Customers, who procure for themselves, and Agencies, who procure for the customers in their region are considered. Basing on a large dataset of open auctions conducted by Russian r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal of public administration 2018-04, Vol.41 (5-6), p.414-434
Main Authors: Detkova, Polina, Podkolzina, Elena, Tkachenko, Andrey
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Auctions
Centralization
Competition
Corruption
Corruption in government
Customers
Government purchasing
Incentives
procurement procedure
Public procurement
Purchasing
repeated contract
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Summary:This paper estimates the impact of corruption on the incentives of procurers to maintain honest competition in tenders. Customers, who procure for themselves, and Agencies, who procure for the customers in their region are considered. Basing on a large dataset of open auctions conducted by Russian regional-level authorities in 2011, the analysis shows that in highly corrupt regions, Agencies fail to arrange competitive tenders and most of auctions have one bidder. Customers attract more bidders for large contracts, but rebates are usually low. Therefore, procurement centralization may reduce the corruption of Customers, but cannot solve the problem of low competition.
ISSN:0190-0692
1532-4265
DOI:10.1080/01900692.2018.1426014