Quid pro quo and the enforcement of intellectual property rights protection: A bargaining approach

This article models a North-South negotiation where the North provides a quid pro quo in exchange for the strengthening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South. We show that when Northern and Southern firms compete on quantity in the Southern market, the Sout...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The journal of international trade & economic development 2012-12, Vol.21 (6), p.755-772
Main Authors: Cai, Dapeng, Li, Jie
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Economic development
Economic models
Intellectual property
Intellectual property rights
intellectual property rights (IPR)
International trade
Law enforcement
quid pro quo
Spillovers
Studies
Technology assessment
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Summary:This article models a North-South negotiation where the North provides a quid pro quo in exchange for the strengthening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South. We show that when Northern and Southern firms compete on quantity in the Southern market, the South's optimal choice is either complete protection or complete violation, irrespective of different levels of IPR protection being available. We show this to depend on the Southern government's valuation of the quid pro quo and the Northern firm's level of technology.
ISSN:0963-8199
1469-9559
DOI:10.1080/09638199.2010.534810