Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We fi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Defence and peace economics 2016-08, Vol.27 (4), p.535-548
Main Authors: Giacomello, Giampiero, Lambertini, Luca
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Balance of power
Defensive shields
Deterrence
Game theory
Nuclear weapons
Peace negotiations
Peace studies
Political power
War games
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Summary:We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if the latter are symmetric across countries, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clear-cut destabilising consequences.
ISSN:1024-2694
1476-8267
DOI:10.1080/10242694.2015.1055937