Networked innovation and coalition formation: the effect of group-based social preferences

In this paper, we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in networked innovation systems, where group-based s...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics of innovation and new technology 2018-10, Vol.27 (7), p.577-593
Main Authors: Dedeurwaerdere, Tom, Melindi-Ghidi, Paolo, Sas, Willem
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Coalition formation
Dissemination
Economic models
Economics and Finance
Empirical analysis
Humanities and Social Sciences
Influence
Innovations
Knowledge management
networked innovation
Open source software
open-source software (OSS)
private-collective model
public knowledge goods
Repositories
social preferences
Software development
Source code
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Summary:In this paper, we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in networked innovation systems, where group-based social preferences have an impact on the coalition formation of developers. Our model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences, such as 'group belonging' or 'peer approval', influence the stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large-scale surveys of open-source software developers, previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable but mixed coalitions.
ISSN:1043-8599
1476-8364
DOI:10.1080/10438599.2017.1378163