Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule

Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of err...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Global economic review 2022-01, Vol.51 (1), p.1-17
Main Authors: Kim, Duk Gyoo, Lee, Jinhyuk, Shin, Euncheol
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Collective decision
Editing
Errors
Fines & penalties
Majority rule
optimal proofreading
optimal voting rule
qualified majority rule
representative agent
Voting rules
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Summary:Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of errors. Proofreading continues as long as a qualified majority votes for continuation. Once the proofreading process ends, and the policy is implemented, members receive heterogeneous penalties based on the remaining errors. We characterize the optimal voting rule given the costs and penalties for the committee. We find that any qualified voting rule, including majority rule, for proofreading is inefficient.
ISSN:1226-508X
1744-3873
DOI:10.1080/1226508X.2022.2040379