No reason for identity: on the relation between motivating and normative reasons

This essay is concerned with the relation between motivating and normative reasons. According to a common and influential thesis, a normative reason is identical with a motivating reason when an agent acts for that normative reason. I will call this thesis the 'Identity Thesis'. Many philo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical explorations 2014-01, Vol.17 (1), p.49-62
Main Author: Mantel, Susanne
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
acting for a reason
Dancy
Identity
motivating reasons
Motivation
normative reasons
Philosophy
psychologism
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Summary:This essay is concerned with the relation between motivating and normative reasons. According to a common and influential thesis, a normative reason is identical with a motivating reason when an agent acts for that normative reason. I will call this thesis the 'Identity Thesis'. Many philosophers treat the Identity Thesis as a commonplace or a truism. Accordingly, the Identity Thesis has been used to rule out certain ontological views about reasons. I distinguish a deliberative and an explanatory version of the Identity Thesis and argue that there are no convincing arguments to accept either version. Furthermore, I point out an alternative to the Identity Thesis. The relation between motivating and normative reasons can be thought of as one of representation, not identity.
ISSN:1386-9795
1741-5918
DOI:10.1080/13869795.2013.815261