The European Community as Monetarist Construction: A Critique of Moravcsik

A critique of Andrew Moravcsik's The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (1998) acknowledges the fundamental validity of Moravcsik's basic three-stage model, but identifies omitted geopolitical, institutional, ideological, & class dimensions, &a...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of European area studies 2000-11, Vol.8 (2), p.247-265
Main Author: Moss, Bernard H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic Factors
European Union
Organizational Development
Political Economy
Treaties
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:A critique of Andrew Moravcsik's The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (1998) acknowledges the fundamental validity of Moravcsik's basic three-stage model, but identifies omitted geopolitical, institutional, ideological, & class dimensions, & offers a more balanced explanation of the initial negotiations of the European Community (EC) & the treaties of Rome & Maastricht. Moravcsik's model is explained, noting producers represented by peak associations determine their interest preferences in pursuit of export opportunities first amassed & evaluated by national governments, then negotiated with others to realize mutually beneficial arrangements. It is contended that his method neither furnishes justification for the selection/ordering of facts nor describes actual decision making. A detailed analysis of the Rome & Maastricht treaties indicates that Moravcsik fails to incorporate industrial & monetary asymmetries in his bargaining theory. Although powerful, the study also ignores the unintended constraints resulting from EC institutions, laws, & policies. It is maintained that the missing dimensions were crucial in determining the chosen Europe. J. Lindroth
ISSN:1460-8464
1469-946X
DOI:10.1080/14608460020014194