How unexpected events are processed in theory of mind regions: A conceptual replication

• Published in: Social neuroscience 2023-05, Vol.18 (3), p.155-170
• Main Authors: McManus, Ryan M., Dungan, James A, Jiang, Kevin, Young, Liane
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Cognition; prediction error; Predictions; social neuroscience; Theory of mind
• ISSN: 1747-0919; 1747-0927
• DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2023.2218620

Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions - an agent's prior mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, preferences) or an agent's prior behavior - as well as the type of information that confirms or violates such predictions. That is, does prior information about mental states (versus behavior) afford stronger predictions about an agent's subsequent mental states or behaviors? Additionally, when information about an agent's prior mental states or behavior is available, is PE signal strongest when information about an agent's subsequent mental state (vs behavior) is revealed? In line with prior research, results suggest that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are recruited more for unexpected than expected outcomes. However, PE signal does not seem to discriminate on the basis of prior or outcome information type. These findings suggest that ToM regions may flexibly incorporate any available information to make predictions about, monitor, and perhaps explain, inconsistencies in social agents.