What is the motivation? The political economy of engineers regulation in Kenya

• Published in: African journal of science, technology, innovation and development technology, innovation and development, 2023-07, Vol.15 (5), p.637-649
• Main Author: K'Akumu, O. A.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Africa; engineering profession; public interest theory; regulatory agency; special interest theory
• ISSN: 2042-1338; 2042-1346
• DOI: 10.1080/20421338.2023.2173909

Regulation is usually justified by the public interest in theory but in practice may end up serving special interests. This paper evaluates the regulatory frameworks for engineers and engineering technologists in Kenya with the view to establishing whether they take the public interest into consideration or only other special interests. Taking public interest into account is necessary to foster development and avoid regulatory conflicts. The study used qualitative document analysis (QDA) to collect and analyze the documentary data available in relevant statutes, namely the Engineers Registration Act (1969-2012), the Engineers Act (from 2012), and the Engineering Technology Act, as well as the Auditor-General's annual reports. The main aim of the study is to establish whether the regulators are motivated by public interest or not. The findings are that public interest is not the main goal because regulators focus on non-regulatory activities such as business investments, there is capture of regulatory instruments by the regulator, there is limited inclusion of other actors in the regulatory operations, there is engagement in extraprofessional activities with the risk of distraction from the core mandate of professional regulation, there is budgeting for excess funds, a lack of clear definition of the public interest in the relevant sections of the statute. The findings confirm pursuit of special interests by the regulators, rather than the public interest. The main contribution of the study is that in developing and African countries, regulatory mechanism of professions can be captured by the regulators to further narrow or special interests, just as it happens with the regulation of businesses.