An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter‐Gatherer Societies

I apply features of the economics of conflict and spatial competition in developing a model of the emergence of land ownership in hunter‐gatherer societies. Tenure regimes are the result of interactions between those seeking to defend claims to land and those seeking to infringe on those claims. The...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of political economy 2003-02, Vol.111 (1), p.124-173
Main Author: Baker, Matthew J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anthropology
Conflict
Costs
Defense
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Endowments
Equilibrium models
Hunter-gatherers
Hunting and gathering societies
Land ownership
Land tenure
Landowners
Marginal value
Modeling
Natural resources
Ownership changes
Pastoralism
Political economy
State of nature
Studies
Territoriality
Territories
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:I apply features of the economics of conflict and spatial competition in developing a model of the emergence of land ownership in hunter‐gatherer societies. Tenure regimes are the result of interactions between those seeking to defend claims to land and those seeking to infringe on those claims. The model highlights the dependence of land ownership on ecological parameters, such as resource density and predictability, and allows for situational ownership, in which the nature of ownership changes as realized ecological conditions change. The paper concludes with a comparative assessment of tenure across a representative sample of hunter‐gatherer peoples.
ISSN:0022-3808
1537-534X
DOI:10.1086/344800