Realism, Antirealism, and Conventionalism about Race

This paper distinguishes three concepts of “race”: bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in1962, A. W. F. Edwards’s2003r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 2014-12, Vol.81 (5), p.1039-1052
Main Authors: Kaplan, Jonathan Michael, Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Antirealism
Biology
Conventionalism
Discourse analysis
Genomics
Historical analysis
Human genetics
Humans
Metagenomics
Metaphysics
Normativity
Philosophy of science
Population genetics
Population structure
Race
Realism
Semantics
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Summary:This paper distinguishes three concepts of “race”: bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in1962, A. W. F. Edwards’s2003response to Lewontin’s1972paper, and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by interrogating the relevance of these scientific discussions for political positions and a post-racial future.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/678314