Master-slave game Modeling of Energy subsidy pricing based on demand response

This paper presents a master-slave game model of demand response between power grid companies and multiple users. Firstly, the objective functions of power supplier and power user revenue are established by considering the customer satisfaction and power fluctuation cost. Then, the variables in the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IOP conference series. Earth and environmental science 2021-01, Vol.621 (1), p.12034
Main Authors: Wang, Yongli, Yao, Suhang, Zhou, Minhan, Dong, Huanran, Qu, Daomin, Bai, Jie
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Customer satisfaction
Electric power grids
Game theory
Model testing
Peak load
Subsidies
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Summary:This paper presents a master-slave game model of demand response between power grid companies and multiple users. Firstly, the objective functions of power supplier and power user revenue are established by considering the customer satisfaction and power fluctuation cost. Then, the variables in the model are divided into strategy sets of the two players by the decision variable mapping set technique, and the equilibrium solution is obtained after multiple rounds of games. The example shows that the subsidy price of peak load period can be obtained by the grid company based on the model, and both the grid company and the user can benefit from the demand response.
ISSN:1755-1307
1755-1315
DOI:10.1088/1755-1315/621/1/012034