Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty

Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The British journal for the philosophy of science 2011-06, Vol.62 (2), p.323-342
Main Author: Bradley, D. J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ambivalence
Conditional probabilities
Empirical evidence
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Learning
Learning procedures
Measurement
Modal realism
Observational learning
Philosophical analysis
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Probabilities
Quantum mechanics
Quantum physics
Selection
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Summary:Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are (Section 1) and how they are relevant to learning where we are in the world (Section 2). I will show how measurements in the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics can be understood as learning where you are in the world via some observation selection effect (Section 3). I will apply a similar argument to the Sleeping Beauty Problem (Section 4) and explain what I take the significance of the analogy to be (Section 5). Finally, I will defend the Restricted Principle of Indifference on which some of my arguments depend (Section 6).
ISSN:0007-0882
1464-3537
DOI:10.1093/bjps/axq013