Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

• Published in: International studies quarterly 2019-12, Vol.63 (4), p.963-973
• Main Authors: Weiss, Jessica Chen, Dafoe, Allan
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: CONFLICT AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
• ISSN: 0020-8833; 1468-2478
• DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqz059

How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda impact Chinese citizens’ approval of their government’s performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster—vague and ultimately empty threats—suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers.