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Trade Agreements and Sustainability: Exploring the Potential of Global Value Chain (GVC) Obligations
ABSTRACT This article investigates the potential of global value chain (GVC)-orientated sustainability provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements (FTAs). Such provisions impose social and environmental obligations directly onto GVCs, as opposed to creating obligations for governments. The...
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Published in: | Journal of international economic law 2023-06, Vol.26 (2), p.199-215 |
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container_title | Journal of international economic law |
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creator | Harrison, James |
description | ABSTRACT
This article investigates the potential of global value chain (GVC)-orientated sustainability provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements (FTAs). Such provisions impose social and environmental obligations directly onto GVCs, as opposed to creating obligations for governments. The theoretical potential of GVC provisions is examined, and the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy are introduced as values by which to assess them. Four recent sets of provisions are then scrutinized. These are (i) palm oil sustainability standards from the Indonesia–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Comprehensive Economic Partnerhsip Agreement (CEPA) FTA, (ii) hen welfare standards in the European Union–Mercosur Association Agreement, (iii) a stipulation of a minimum average wage for the automobile industry in the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and (iv) enforcement of collective bargaining and freedom of association directly against factories, also in the USMCA. All of these provisions are found to have significant deficiencies. At the same time, it is argued that three different governance models underpin them, namely (i) third-party certification schemes, (ii) domestic regulations of one of the parties, and (iii) bespoke arrangements created for the FTA in question. The article therefore considers the potential and drawbacks of each governance model in terms of their effectiveness and legitimacy, as well as alternative and complementary commitments including unilateral measures and subject-specific trade agreements. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/jiel/jgac057 |
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This article investigates the potential of global value chain (GVC)-orientated sustainability provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements (FTAs). Such provisions impose social and environmental obligations directly onto GVCs, as opposed to creating obligations for governments. The theoretical potential of GVC provisions is examined, and the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy are introduced as values by which to assess them. Four recent sets of provisions are then scrutinized. These are (i) palm oil sustainability standards from the Indonesia–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Comprehensive Economic Partnerhsip Agreement (CEPA) FTA, (ii) hen welfare standards in the European Union–Mercosur Association Agreement, (iii) a stipulation of a minimum average wage for the automobile industry in the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and (iv) enforcement of collective bargaining and freedom of association directly against factories, also in the USMCA. All of these provisions are found to have significant deficiencies. At the same time, it is argued that three different governance models underpin them, namely (i) third-party certification schemes, (ii) domestic regulations of one of the parties, and (iii) bespoke arrangements created for the FTA in question. The article therefore considers the potential and drawbacks of each governance model in terms of their effectiveness and legitimacy, as well as alternative and complementary commitments including unilateral measures and subject-specific trade agreements.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1369-3034</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1464-3758</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/jiel/jgac057</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>UK: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Collective bargaining ; Environmental law ; Freedom of association ; Sustainable development ; Treaties ; World Trade Organization</subject><ispartof>Journal of international economic law, 2023-06, Vol.26 (2), p.199-215</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press. 2023</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c460t-34672f78ca19f9b50b7acf470b9b34e3d068abac57c93c6e5f66a021a8121f103</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Harrison, James</creatorcontrib><title>Trade Agreements and Sustainability: Exploring the Potential of Global Value Chain (GVC) Obligations</title><title>Journal of international economic law</title><description>ABSTRACT
This article investigates the potential of global value chain (GVC)-orientated sustainability provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements (FTAs). Such provisions impose social and environmental obligations directly onto GVCs, as opposed to creating obligations for governments. The theoretical potential of GVC provisions is examined, and the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy are introduced as values by which to assess them. Four recent sets of provisions are then scrutinized. These are (i) palm oil sustainability standards from the Indonesia–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Comprehensive Economic Partnerhsip Agreement (CEPA) FTA, (ii) hen welfare standards in the European Union–Mercosur Association Agreement, (iii) a stipulation of a minimum average wage for the automobile industry in the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and (iv) enforcement of collective bargaining and freedom of association directly against factories, also in the USMCA. All of these provisions are found to have significant deficiencies. At the same time, it is argued that three different governance models underpin them, namely (i) third-party certification schemes, (ii) domestic regulations of one of the parties, and (iii) bespoke arrangements created for the FTA in question. The article therefore considers the potential and drawbacks of each governance model in terms of their effectiveness and legitimacy, as well as alternative and complementary commitments including unilateral measures and subject-specific trade agreements.</description><subject>Collective bargaining</subject><subject>Environmental law</subject><subject>Freedom of association</subject><subject>Sustainable development</subject><subject>Treaties</subject><subject>World Trade Organization</subject><issn>1369-3034</issn><issn>1464-3758</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2023</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>TOX</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kNFKwzAUhosoOKd3PkDuVLDupGnT1bsx5iYMJjh3G07TpMvompFk4N7ezs1br87P4TvfgT-K7im8UCjYYGNUM9jUKCHLL6IeTXkaszwbXnaZ8SJmwNLr6Mb7DQDNU0p7UbV0WCkyqp1SW9UGT7CtyOfeBzQtlqYx4fBKJt-7xjrT1iSsFfmwoSMNNsRqMm1s2aUVNntFxuvuijxOV-MnsigbU2MwtvW30ZXGxqu78-xHX2-T5XgWzxfT9_FoHsuUQ4hZyvNE50OJtNBFmUGZo9RpDmVRslSxCvgQS5RZLgsmuco05wgJxSFNqKbA-tHzySud9d4pLXbObNEdBAVxbEgcGxLnhjp8dsLd1gSBtfG7ILxCJ9fCtNr-rq2rRWXN0cAY5X9YAgkDngAUwAreqR5OKrvf_f_0B0y2gVc</recordid><startdate>20230601</startdate><enddate>20230601</enddate><creator>Harrison, James</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>TOX</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20230601</creationdate><title>Trade Agreements and Sustainability: Exploring the Potential of Global Value Chain (GVC) Obligations</title><author>Harrison, James</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c460t-34672f78ca19f9b50b7acf470b9b34e3d068abac57c93c6e5f66a021a8121f103</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2023</creationdate><topic>Collective bargaining</topic><topic>Environmental law</topic><topic>Freedom of association</topic><topic>Sustainable development</topic><topic>Treaties</topic><topic>World Trade Organization</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Harrison, James</creatorcontrib><collection>Oxford Open</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Journal of international economic law</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Harrison, James</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Trade Agreements and Sustainability: Exploring the Potential of Global Value Chain (GVC) Obligations</atitle><jtitle>Journal of international economic law</jtitle><date>2023-06-01</date><risdate>2023</risdate><volume>26</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>199</spage><epage>215</epage><pages>199-215</pages><issn>1369-3034</issn><eissn>1464-3758</eissn><abstract>ABSTRACT
This article investigates the potential of global value chain (GVC)-orientated sustainability provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements (FTAs). Such provisions impose social and environmental obligations directly onto GVCs, as opposed to creating obligations for governments. The theoretical potential of GVC provisions is examined, and the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy are introduced as values by which to assess them. Four recent sets of provisions are then scrutinized. These are (i) palm oil sustainability standards from the Indonesia–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Comprehensive Economic Partnerhsip Agreement (CEPA) FTA, (ii) hen welfare standards in the European Union–Mercosur Association Agreement, (iii) a stipulation of a minimum average wage for the automobile industry in the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and (iv) enforcement of collective bargaining and freedom of association directly against factories, also in the USMCA. All of these provisions are found to have significant deficiencies. At the same time, it is argued that three different governance models underpin them, namely (i) third-party certification schemes, (ii) domestic regulations of one of the parties, and (iii) bespoke arrangements created for the FTA in question. The article therefore considers the potential and drawbacks of each governance model in terms of their effectiveness and legitimacy, as well as alternative and complementary commitments including unilateral measures and subject-specific trade agreements.</abstract><cop>UK</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/jiel/jgac057</doi><tpages>17</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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source | EconLit s plnými texty; Lexis+ UK; Oxford Journals Online |
subjects | Collective bargaining Environmental law Freedom of association Sustainable development Treaties World Trade Organization |
title | Trade Agreements and Sustainability: Exploring the Potential of Global Value Chain (GVC) Obligations |
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