Banks’ Incentives and Inconsistent Risk Models

This paper investigates banks’ incentive to bias the risk estimates they report to regulators. Within loan syndicates, we find that banks with less capital report lower risk estimates. Consistent with an effort to mitigate capital requirements, the sensitivity to capital is robust to bank fixed effe...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Review of financial studies 2018-06, Vol.31 (6), p.2080-2112
Main Authors: Plosser, Matthew C., Santos, João A. C.
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:This paper investigates banks’ incentive to bias the risk estimates they report to regulators. Within loan syndicates, we find that banks with less capital report lower risk estimates. Consistent with an effort to mitigate capital requirements, the sensitivity to capital is robust to bank fixed effects and greater for large, risky, and opaque credits. Also, low-capital banks’ risk estimates have less explanatory power than those of high-capital banks with regard to loan prices, indicating that their estimates incorporate less information. Our results suggest banks underreport risk in response to capital constraints and highlight the perils of regulation premised on self-reporting.
ISSN:0893-9454
1465-7368
DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhy028