Keep Your Promise: Mechanism Design Against Free-Riding and False-Reporting in Crowdsourcing

Crowdsourcing is an emerging paradigm where users can have their tasks completed by paying fees, or receive rewards for providing service. A critical problem that arises in current crowdsourcing mechanisms is how to ensure that users pay or receive what they deserve. Free-riding and false-reporting...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE internet of things journal 2015-12, Vol.2 (6), p.562-572
Main Authors: Zhang, Xiang, Xue, Guoliang, Yu, Ruozhou, Yang, Dejun, Tang, Jian
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Computational modeling
Crowdsourcing
Dishonesty
false-reporting
free-riding
Game theory
Games
Honesty
incentive mechanisms
Internet of things
Mobile communication
Warranties
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Summary:Crowdsourcing is an emerging paradigm where users can have their tasks completed by paying fees, or receive rewards for providing service. A critical problem that arises in current crowdsourcing mechanisms is how to ensure that users pay or receive what they deserve. Free-riding and false-reporting may make the system vulnerable to dishonest users. In this paper, we design schemes to tackle these problems, so that each individual in the system is better off being honest and each provider prefers completing the assigned task. We first design a mechanism EFF which eliminates dishonest behavior with the help from a trusted third party for arbitration. We then design another mechanism DFF which, without the help from any third party, discourages dishonest behavior. We also prove that DFF is semi-truthful, which discourages dishonest behavior such as free-riding and false-reporting when the rest of the individuals are honest, while guaranteeing transaction-wise budget-balance and computational efficiency. Performance evaluation shows that within our mechanisms, no user could have a utility gain by unilaterally being dishonest.
ISSN:2327-4662
2327-4662
DOI:10.1109/JIOT.2015.2441031