Femtocell Operator Entry Decision with Spectrum Bargaining and Service Competition

This paper analyzes the effect of the entry of a femtocell operator into a mobile communications market where a macrocell operator exists. The analysis is conducted using a game-theory-based model, specifically a three-level multi leader-follower game, where different solution concepts are applied:...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE communications letters 2012-12, Vol.16 (12), p.1976-1979
Main Authors: Guijarro, L., Pla, V., Vidal, J. R., Martinez--Bauset, J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Computer science
control theory
systems
Computer systems and distributed systems. User interface
Economics
Exact sciences and technology
femtocell
Femtocell networks
Game theory
Macrocell networks
Oligopoly
Operational research and scientific management
Operational research. Management science
Pricing
Radiocommunications
Software
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and information theory
wireless communications
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Summary:This paper analyzes the effect of the entry of a femtocell operator into a mobile communications market where a macrocell operator exists. The analysis is conducted using a game-theory-based model, specifically a three-level multi leader-follower game, where different solution concepts are applied: Shapley value, Nash equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium. It aims to answer the question of which benefit mobile communication users get from the entry of a femtocell operator into the market. The equilibrium is assessed from the point of view of each agent (e.g. profits and utilities), and of the whole (e.g. social welfare). A case for regulatory intervention is made.
ISSN:1089-7798
1558-2558
DOI:10.1109/LCOMM.2012.101712.121645