Credibility of Threats to Jam Anonymous Traffic Remapping Attacks in Ad Hoc WLANs

In ad hoc networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) by performing traffic remapping attacks (TRAs), i.e., by falsely assigning their traffic to a higher priority class, which can hurt honest stations' QoS. To discourage the attackers, honest stations can announce t...

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Published in:IEEE communications letters 2017-03, Vol.21 (3), p.624-627
Main Authors: Konorski, Jerzy, Szott, Szymon
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ad hoc networks
EDCA
game theory
Games
IEEE 802.11
IEEE 802.11 Standard
Jamming
QoS
Quality of service
selfish behavior
Throughput
traffic remapping
Wireless LAN
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description In ad hoc networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) by performing traffic remapping attacks (TRAs), i.e., by falsely assigning their traffic to a higher priority class, which can hurt honest stations' QoS. To discourage the attackers, honest stations can announce their dissatisfaction with the perceived QoS. If such a threat fails, a costly data frame jamming defense can be launched. We analyze the arising noncooperative game in which the attackers decide whether to continue a TRA when threatened and honest stations decide whether to start jamming when the TRA is continued. Using a Maynard Smith setting, we prove that the threats are credible to a rational attacker, who will then refrain from playing the game and remain honest.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/LCOMM.2016.2639483
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source IEEE Xplore (Online service)
subjects Ad hoc networks
EDCA
game theory
Games
IEEE 802.11
IEEE 802.11 Standard
Jamming
QoS
Quality of service
selfish behavior
Throughput
traffic remapping
Wireless LAN
title Credibility of Threats to Jam Anonymous Traffic Remapping Attacks in Ad Hoc WLANs
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