Suppressing Epidemic Spreading by Imitating Hub Nodes' Strategy

In this brief, we incorporate the impact of preferential imitation rule into a vaccination game based epidemic spreading model on social networks, where each individual chooses one of its neighbors as an imitation reference with a probability proportional to the neighbor's degree. Our results i...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on circuits and systems. II, Express briefs Express briefs, 2020-10, Vol.67 (10), p.1979-1983
Main Authors: Zhang, Hai-Feng, Wang, Zhen
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Color
Complex networks
Decision making
Diseases
Epidemics
Game theory
Games
Immunization
Integrated circuit modeling
Nodes
preferential imitation
Social networks
spreading of epidemic
Vaccines
voluntary vaccination
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:In this brief, we incorporate the impact of preferential imitation rule into a vaccination game based epidemic spreading model on social networks, where each individual chooses one of its neighbors as an imitation reference with a probability proportional to the neighbor's degree. Our results indicate that the vaccination coverage can be remarkably increased if hub nodes are preferentially imitated, leading to the dramatic reduction of the epidemic size. We explain this by suggesting that the vaccination willingness of hub nodes is very high when voluntary vaccination mechanism is assumed, who can attract more individuals to take vaccination if they are preferentially imitated. Moreover, a mean-field theoretical approach is developed to further verify our findings. This brief suggests that the human behavioral response is an important factor for spreading dynamics.
ISSN:1549-7747
1558-3791
DOI:10.1109/TCSII.2019.2938775